

Chapter Four: Italy: The Regia Marina. Expanded Notes

Page 121: **Duilio (1876)** . . . See Robert Gardiner, *Conway's All of the World's Fighting Ships 1860-1905* (London: Conway, 1979), 340-41

Page 126: **Instead, driven by the expectation of a short war.** . . . Italy's absolutely relied on maritime trade to sustain its economy. Since 1931 The Italian navy had taken as a given the loss of a third of the country's merchant vessels on the first day of war against Britain. The final balance was slightly better. Giuliano Colliva, *Ufficio trasporti rifornimenti in guerra, studi per un conflitto (1931-1940)*, Bollettino d'Archivio dell'Ufficio Storico della Marina Militare, Dec. 2005.

Page 126: **As the situation evolved and the two . . .** See Gerhard Schreiber, et al, *Germany and the Second World War: The Mediterranean, South-East Europe, and North Africa 1939-1941* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 248-9.

Page 127: **Some historians have interpreted an April 1940 . . .** For example, "The naval leadership's ultimate unspoken purpose was to preserve the fleet as an end in itself by disguising it as a diplomatic bargaining counter." MacGregor Knox, *Hitler's Italian Allies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 88.

Page 127: **The Allies, with their superior forces and . . .** Knox, *Mussolini Unleashed, 1939-1941* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 94. Naval leaders universally expected that advances in target acquisition systems had rendered long-range naval combat deadly and that just a few minutes of naval combat would lead to crippling losses.

Page 128: **The military's total appropriations . . .** See Table 1.9 in Sadkovich. *Italian Navy in World War II*. (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994), 34.

Page 128: **Even democratic Britain spent . . .** <http://rhino.shef.ac.uk:3001/mr-home/hobbies/gnp.txt> However, different sources use different numbers. See I. C. B. Dear, *Oxford Companion to World War II* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 583, which states that in 1935-39 Italy spent on its military 89.5 percent of the UK total and 22.8 percent more than France.

Page 130. **In 1940 its enrollment was 697 students . . .** Aldo Santini, *Livorno ammiraglia* (Leghorn: Belforte, 1981), 214.

Page 131: **Between 1940 and 1943, section B deciphered . . .** Enrico Cernuschi, "L'attività crittografica delle marine inglese e italiana prima e durante la Seconda guerra mondiale: un bilancio." Unpublished manuscript.

Page 133: **By September 1943 Italian torpedo bombers . . .** Pierre Hervieux, "Le operazioni degli aerosiluranti italiani e tedeschi nel Mediterraneo," *STORIA Militare*, March 1997.

Page 143: **Italian fire-control systems also included . . .** John Campbell, *Naval Weapons of World War II* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2002), 319.

Page 143-44: **Battleships and cruisers had dedicated . . .** Ibid., 342.

Page 144: **Both guns were reliable, although . . .** Ibid., 345.

Page 144: **Italian torpedoes were generally reliable . . .** Enrico Cernuschi, "Torpedo Warfare," Unpublished manuscript.

Page 145: **Some sources credit Regia . . .** Paul Kemp, *The Admiralty Regrets: British Warship Losses of the 20th Century* (Phoenix Mill, England: Sutton Publishing, 1999), 179 states that this is the most likely explanation. The official publication *Statement of Losses* from 1947 speculates that *Urge* was mined.

Page 145: **In June 1940 the navy had an inventory . . .** Campbell, *Naval Weapons of WWII*, 352.

Page 149: **Italy was largely or entirely deficient . . .** Ellis, *World War II: a Statistical Survey*, 274.

Page 150: **In 1940 the Regia Marina sank eleven . . .** Ufficio Storico Marina Militare, "Dati Statistici", Rome 1972 and "Navi mercantili perdute", Rome 1997. Jurgen Rohwer *Allied Submarine Attacks of World War Two* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997) gives slightly different numbers for Italian tonnage lost. Peter Padfield. *War Beneath the Sea* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1995), 131 points out the restrictions the British submarine force operated under during the war's initial months.

Page 150: **The Regia Marina lost twenty . . .** Jurgen Rohwer. *Axis Submarine Successes of World War Two* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1999) for Allied tonnage lost. The majority of this tonnage was lost in the Atlantic. In spite of many legends HUMINT and not SIGINT Intelligence facilitated the loss of only two Italian submarines (*Torricelli* and *Galvani*) in the first two weeks of war. The capture of the Italian submarine code (without the subtractors tables, which had to be reconstructed during the following weeks) on the *Uebi Scebeli* on 29 June 1940 could not be effectively used as the Regia Marina was able to decrypt, on 12 July, a Royal Navy wireless message which betrayed this capture adopting, the same day, an emergency system based on the initials of the single wireless operators at sea and introducing later new single boat codes.

Page 153: **The Italians accounted for 43 percent . . .** These figures are compiled from a number of sources including Cernuschi, *Fecero tutti il loro dovere* (87-97); Brown, *Warship Losses of World War II*. Kemp, *The Admiralty Regrets*, Gardner, *Conway's All the World's Warships 1922-1946* and Bagnasco and Cernuschi. *Le Navi da Guerra italiane 1940-1945*. They include ships sunk and later salvaged like *Queen Elizabeth* and *Valiant*. Some sources (Kemp and Cernuschi) consider that these ships were only damaged.

Page 155: **The Regia Marina was likewise more successful . . .** The 1940 numbers are 2.7 Allied boats sunk or damaged monthly against an average of thirteen submarines active per month. See Enrico Cernuschi, "La verità sommersa," *Rivista Marittima* (February, 1995).

Page 155: **In the all-important convoy war, . . .** This includes the Balkans. If Libya and Tunisia alone are considered the numbers are still impressive: 92 percent of the men and 83 percent of the materiel arrived.

Page 156: **The impact on Britain was devastating.** See Kevin Smith, *Conflict over Convoys* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 38.